... and open source software

They have to show their code.  

They have to create a paper trail.  

It's not that hard to grok.

Paper solves nothing

If there's a machine that requires a program, it will be hacked or it will be programmed to misbehave in the first place.

Any kind of paper ticket that the voter checks does a couple of things: 1) it destroys the illusion of a secret ballot (unless the voter signs it, whose to know whether it was checked?) 2) how do we count the little cash register receipts?  Take a complex ballot and you have a multi-billion dollar project. 3) Ever typed in your secret code to gain access to a restricted web page, like this one?  Do you see your secret code?  Of course not.  It's that easy to hide what's actually recorded in the bowels of a computer.

Someone tell me why Common Cause, and all the other would be do gooders out there haven't gotten behind VOTE BY MAIL.  I live in Oregon where we've used it for several cycles now and it works.  Not only that, it's even cheaper than running precincts using the same counting procedures.  If we had to install voting machines and then maintain them, we'd spend many times as much.  

In 2004, we had over 86% participation and no (not one) case of fraud.  Not only that, except for one step of the process (once the secret ballot envelope is separated from its mailing envelope, the two can't be re-associated) all the materials are retained and can be recounted.  Even the signature envelopes are retained.

How do we know a ballot hasn't been hijacked?  First, we have the State Police train all Elections Clerks in signature recognition.  They get pretty good at it very quickly.  Then we put every signature in a digital file that can be called up for comparison.  Every single mail in envelope is checked against this file.  (I was running ballots for the elderly in 2004 and told the election clerk that a particular voter was housebound if not bedridden with advanced Parkinsons.  The checked his signature and found it had deteriorated some.  They called his home to check to see whether he'd submitted a ballot.  He described the circumstances under which it had been collected and they accepted it.)

And, by the way, the first Clackamas County returns were published only 10 minutes after the ceremonial 8PM poll closing.  Most of the checking is done as ballots come in.  Optical scanners, not connected to any network, are tested with a known sample of test ballots both before and after each official counting run.  And poll watchers who represent every conceivable constituency, actually can understand what they're watching.  Any challenge results in a recount with the original ballot, not some flimsy, thermal printed, cash register receipt.

Come on Common Cause.  You have a working example in Oregon.  The Secretary of State will be happy to share his experience with it.  In fact, almost every state has some form of mail in balloting already: absentee ballots.  Some things just aren't worth making more complex.

ryarnell@iwon.com

ryarnell

Paper solves nothing?

Barbara Burt, Common Cause Election Reform Team Leader

Electronic Voting

As a former IBM and Digital Equipment employee interested in security and in some ways specializing in it, I believe the paper trail idea will be used as a "trap for fools" to quote Kipling.  If "The real secret to election integrity is random surprise audits comparing paper ballot counts to machine counts", how are we going to get paper ballot counts that are reliable (i.e. cannot be challenged in court because they are demonstrably non-forgeable, for instance)?  Does the count require every voter retain his voting record for N weeks?  (A voting machine can give me a receipt saying I voted for whom I actually voted for but record an electronic vote for Dick Cheney.)  And how can I, as a voter, demand proof that my vote was counted correctly, without telling someone who I voted for (and having my name recorded with my vote in the electronic system)?  And the vast majority of people, probably most election officials, are probably clueless about security in electronic systems, so they could be readily fooled.

Months ago - maybe a couple of years - NPR had a news feature about how Las Vegas casinos' electronic slot machines were audited.  The code in the computer must match a securely / separately maintained copy of the same. I don't remember the details, but suppose the voting audit process were similar, then it might be like this: The source code must be publicly available, in the sense of being available to a set of authorized experts, and every audit must be done by at least two of these experts nationwide chosen at random at the last minute; not only do the experts know the logic in the source code, but also an audit includes translating the public source into voting-machine computer language and compared to what is in there.  Even with this level of audit, there are several ways to fool such audits that I haven't begun to think about. Perhaps the experts would have a tool to record the logic of the code running in the machine.

I would add that companies that keep money in electronic accounts must be constantly vigilant, and in theory there is no foolproof protection - one must ultimately trust the programmers.  But these companies combine lots and lots of procedural constraints as well as electronic means to try to limit theft (alteration of data).

In reply to Ms Burt

I did not expect to find prevarication in these pages, especially from a "team leader."

First, VOTE BY MAIL is pertinent to this discussion because it stands as the most reliable alternative to any kind of computer driven machine voting.

Yes, the post office is extremely reliable as a delivery service especially since ballots are delivered locally in almost all cases.  

Optical scanners, like all machines, are subject to failure.  However, those failures are easily discovered and are not subject to deliberate fraud.  In Oregon, every machine is tested with a pre-counted stack of ballots both immediately before and immediately after each formal ballot count.  But more important, the ballots used in vote by mail systems are intended to be machine counted.  I have never seen an explanation of the process by which cash-register receipt ballot records would be counted, especially when complex ballots of multiple candidates and multiple issues are involved.

Any programmer worth his salt would insure that any deliberate tampering stopped short of margins that triggered hand recounts.  Most fraud using machines will still go undetected.

I think you've invested too much in trying to find a way to salvage computer driven, touch screen, voting machines to be open to suggestion.  

I will not support Common Cause in this insane invitation to have our elections stolen again and in perpetuity.

Richard Yarnell
ryarnell@iwon.com

ryarnell

civil rights movement

The civil rights movement would not have gotten very far without the outside game. Rosa Parks was outside game. The Selma-to-Montgomery March was outside game. The civil rights workers -- some of whom were killed -- were outside game.

The anti-Vietnam War movement would have failed without the outside game. Vietnam Vets Against the War were outside game. Burning draft cards was outside game.

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four color printing