Next year, Congress should deep-six the current FEC and replace it with a new agency as proposed in pending bipartisan legislation. Instead of a deadlocked commission, a new agency would consist of a chairman and two other members appointed by the president from different parties. The chairman, serving a 10-year term, would have broad powers to manage the agency. This structure will help avoid the deadlocks that have plagued the FEC and prevented proper enforcement, resulting in travesties such as the soft-money abuses by the presidential candidates and party committees in the 1996 elections and allowing the problems posed by 527s to explode. The new agency could impose civil monetary penalties or issue cease-and-desist orders in the event of violations, and enforcement proceedings would be conducted before impartial administrative law judges.

The resolution of the von Spakovsky stalemate was certainly overdue. But the stalemate is a symptom of the underlying problem intentionally built into the statute. The FEC was designed for deadlock. In theory, the 3-3 party split is to ensure balance and fairness. In reality, it ensures either partisan warfare that prevents enforcement action or partisan collusion such as that seen at the height of the now-banned soft-money system.

House rules provide only that when a Member is convicted of a crime carrying a sentence of more than two years, he or she "should not" engage in committee business or vote on the floor. Further action is up to the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct and the House membership.

Both parties have formal rules that a leader or committee chairman who's indicted automatically steps down from those posts, but there is no formal rule applying to rank-and-file Members.